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Abstract 
While there has been intense debate in the empirical literature about the effects of minimum 
wages on inequality in the US, its general equilibrium effects have been given little attention. 
In order to quantify the full effects of a decreasing minimum wage on inequality, I build a 
dynamic general equilibrium model, based on a two-sector growth model where the supply of 
high-skilled  workers  and  the  direction  of  technical  change  are  endogenous.  I  find  that  a 
permanent reduction in the minimum wage leads to an expansion of low-skilled employment, 
which increases the incentives to acquire skills, thus changing the composition and size of 
high-skilled  employment.  These  permanent  changes  in  the  supply  of  labour  alter  the 
investment flow into R&D, thereby decreasing the skill-bias of technology. The reduction in 
the  minimum  wage  has  spill-over  effects  on  the  entire  distribution,  affecting  upper-tail 
inequality. Through a calibration exercise, I find that a 30 percent reduction in the real value 
of the minimum wage, as in the early 1980s, accounts for 15 percent of the subsequent rise in 
the  skill  premium,  18.5  percent  of  the  increase  in  overall  inequality,  45  percent  of  the 
increase in inequality in the bottom half, and 7 percent of the rise in inequality at the top half 
of the wage distribution. 
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ItiswelldocumentedthatincomeinequalityhasdrasticallyincreasedintheUnited
States over the past 30 years along several dimensions.1 Inequality increased between
workers with different educational levels: the college premium increased by 18 per-
cent from 1981 to 2006. The distribution of wages also widened: the gaps between
different percentiles of the wage distribution increased drastically. For example, in
2006 a worker at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution earned 283 percent more
than a worker at the 10th percentile, whereas this ﬁgure was 190 percent in 1981.2
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90th/10th percentile skill premium
Figure 1: Wage inequality
Notes: Wages are calculated from CPS May Extracts and MORG supplements. Wages are the exponent
of residuals from regressing log hourly wages on age, age squared, sex and race. The skill premium is
the ratio of the average high-skilled wage to the average low-skilled wage. High school drop outs and
high school graduates are low-skilled, everyone else is high-skilled.
The changes in the structure of wages fuelled an extensive debate on the forces
driving them. One explanation focuses on changes in labour market institutions, and
particularly, on a 30 percent decline in the real minimum wage that took place in the
1980s, since the biggest changes in wage inequality took place during this period (Di-
Nardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), Lee (1999), Card and DiNardo (2002)).
Despite the popularity of this hypothesis, there are, to my knowledge, no attempts
1See for example Eckstein and Nagyp´ al (2004), Goldin and Katz (2007), and Goldin and Katz (2008).
2Calculations from Current Populations Survey (CPS) Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG)
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real minimum wage
minimum wage/average low-skilled wage
minimum wage/average high-skilled wage
Figure 2: The decline in the real minimum wage
Notes: The real hourly minimum wage is the federal minimum wage in 2000$, calculated using the
consumer price index (CPI) from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Average wages are cal-
culated using CPS MORG data. Wages and education categories are as in Figure 1. The left hand scale
is the real value of the minimum wage, while the right hand scale is the ratio of the minimum wage
compared to the average high- and low-skilled wage.
in the literature to quantitatively assess the potential signiﬁcance of falling minimum
wages for wage inequality in the context of a general equilibrium model. People base
their educational decisions on their potential job opportunities and earnings in differ-
ent occupations. Hence, in general equilibrium, changes in the minimum wage could
change the educational composition of the labour force at the aggregate level. Fur-
thermore, the change in the educational composition of the labour force affects the
proﬁtability of R&D differentially across sectors. Therefore, the change in the edu-
cational composition of the labour force affects the choices ﬁrms make about which
sectors to focus their R&D activity on, and this determines the direction of technical
change. Thus, through educational decisions, the minimum wage inﬂuences the di-
rection of technical change. Due to the links between minimum wages, education,
and technological change, the quantitative general equilibrium effects of changes in
the minimum wage on inequality could be quite different from what simple partial
equilibrium reasoning may suggest.
In this paper, I analyse the general equilibrium impact that lower minimum wages
have on inequality. I consider two channels jointly: educational choices and the skill-
3bias of technology. I ﬁnd that lower minimum wages increase wage inequality. This
overall increase is the result of two opposing forces. On the one hand, the educational
and ability composition of the labour force changes, leading to an increase in inequal-
ity. On the other hand, the relative supply of high-skilled labour decreases, which
reduces the skill-bias of technology, and hence inequality.
By building a general equilibrium model with endogenous education and technol-
ogy, and a binding minimum wage, this paper bridges two of the most prominent
explanations for increasing inequality in the literature.3 Most of the theoretical litera-
ture on skill-biased technical change (SBTC) treats either technology or labour supply
as exogenous. I contribute to this literature by allowing both technology and relative
labour supply to adjust endogenously. I contribute to the literature on labour market
institutions, by proposing a general equilibrium model – with endogenous education
and technology – that allows the full quantitative analysis of the effects of falling min-
imum wages.
To do this I build on and extend the two sector model of endogenous growth in
Acemoglu (1998) by adding a binding minimum wage and allowing the supply of
college graduates to be endogenous. As in Acemoglu (1998), the production side is
a two sector Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth, with more R&D spending
going towards technologies that are complementary with the more abundant factor.
I explicitly model the labour supply side: workers, who are heterogeneous in their
ability and time cost of education, make educational decisions optimally. I solve for
the balanced growth path and calibrate the model to the US economy in 1981 in order
to compare the transitional dynamics with the observed patterns of wages in the US
over the subsequent thirty years.
I ﬁnd that a decrease in the minimum wage increases the observed skill premium
and the wage gaps between different percentiles of the wage distribution. According
to the model, the 30 percent decline in the minimum wage accounts for about 15 per-
cent of the observed increase in the skill premium in the US from 1981 to 2006. The
fall in the minimum wage also explains almost one ﬁfth of the observed increase in the
3Another prominent explanation for the increasing inequality – that my paper does not relate to –
is the increasing openness to trade, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) provide an extensive review of this
literature.
490/10 wage differential, and accounts for about one half of the increase in the 50/10
wage gap. In my model, the minimum wage also has some spill-over effects to the top
end of the wage distribution, explaining 7 percent of the increase in the 90/50 wage
gap.
The minimum wage affects inequality through several channels: through changes
in the skill composition, in the ability composition and in directed technology.
The skill composition of the employed changes. As the minimum wage decreases,
low ability workers ﬂow into the low-skilled labour market.4 This increases the skill
premium in the short-run, thus increasing the incentives for acquiring education for
higher ability workers. However, a lower minimum wage also makes it easier to ﬁnd
employment, reducing the role of education in avoiding unemployment. Educational
attainment decreases at the lower end of the ability distribution and increases at the
top end.
The ability composition of the labour aggregates changes, due to both the inﬂow
from unemployment and the changing decision structure of skill acquisition. As the
minimumwagedecreases, lowerabilityworkersﬂowintoemployment, therebywiden-
ing the range of abilities present among the employed. As both labour aggregates
expand, the average ability in both sectors decrease. Since more low-ability individ-
uals enter the low-skilled labour force, the average ability in the low-skilled sector
decreases more. This composition effect reinforces the initial increase in the observed
skill premium.
Finally, the direction of technology reacts to changes in the size of the low- and
high-skilled labour aggregate. The direct effect of the minimum wage – the expansion
of the low-skilled labour force – dominates, decreasing the relative supply of high-
skilled labour. This implies that technology becomes less skill biased in the long run.
4The effects of minimum wages on unemployment are debated in the empirical literature. Brown,
Gilroy, and Kohen (1982), Wellington (1991), Neumark and Wascher (1992) found negative employment
effects, while Card (1992), Card and Krueger (1994) and Machin and Manning (1994) found no or small
positive effects. These latter studies are controversial, see exchange between Neumark and Wascher
(2000) and Card and Krueger (2000). Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger (1999) ﬁnd a negative employment
effect analyzing Canadian data.
52 Related Literature
The underlying causes of increasing inequality are highly debated among labour
economists. There are two leading explanations, skill-biased technical change (SBTC)
and labour market institutions. Many empirical studies concluded that SBTC is the
driving force behind widening earnings inequality (Katz and Murphy (1992), Juhn,
Murphy, and Pierce (1993), Krueger (1993), Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), Au-
tor, Katz, and Krueger (1998)). This literature stems from the observation that the rel-
ative supply of high-skilled workers and the skill premium can only increase together
if the relative demand for high-skilled workers also increases. 5
Other authors have argued that the unprecedented increase in wage inequality
during the 1980s cannot be explained by skill-biased technical change alone. DiNardo,
Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) ﬁnd that changes in labour market institutions – namely
de-unionization and declining minimum wages – are as important as supply and de-
mand factors in explaining increasing inequality. Lee (1999) uses regional variation
in federal minimum wages to identify their impact on inequality, and ﬁnds that min-
imum wages can explain much of the increase in the dispersion at the lower end of
the wage distribution. However, he also ﬁnds that the reduction in minimum wages
is correlated with rising inequality at the top end of the wage distribution. This is
seen by many as a sign that the correlation between declining minimum wages and
increasing inequality is mostly coincidental (Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008)). Card
and DiNardo (2002) revise evidence for the claim that SBTC caused the rise in wage
inequality and ﬁnd that this view has difﬁculties accommodating the stabilization of
wage inequality that occurred in the 1990s.
In the model presented here, the correlation between minimum wages and up-
per tail inequality is not coincidental: I provide a theoretical channel through which
changes in minimum wages can affect inequality along the entire wage distribution. I
ﬁnd that minimum wages affect the bottom end of the wage distribution more, their
impact on the top end is signiﬁcant as well.
5Beaudry and Green (2005) ﬁnd little support for ongoing skill-biased technological progress; in
contrast, they show that changes in the ratio of human capital to physical capital conform to a model of
technological adoption following a major change in technological opportunities.
6In my model, compositional effects play an important role in increasing inequal-
ity, as has been documented in the empirical literature. Lemieux (2006) ﬁnds that the
compositional effects of the secular increase in education and experience explain a
large fraction of the increased residual inequality. The study shows that increases in
residual inequality and the skill premium do not coincide, implying that there must
be other forces at play besides rising demand for high-skilled workers. Autor, Katz,
and Kearney (2005) argue that even though compositional effects have had a positive
impact on wage inequality, they mainly affect the lower tail, while the increase in up-
per tail inequality is mainly due to increasing wage differentials by education. Autor,
Manning, and Smith (2009) assess the effects of minimum wages on inequality and
ﬁnd that minimum wages reduce inequality, but to a smaller extent, and that mini-
mum wages also generate spill-over effects to parts of the wage distribution that are
not directly affected by them.
Inthisstudy, minimumwagesincreaseeducationalattainmentatthelowendofthe
ability distribution, while reducing educational attainment everywhere else through
spill-over effects. In line with these ﬁndings, the empirical evidence on the effects of
minimum wages on educational attainment is mixed. Neumark and Wascher (2003)
and Neumark and Nizalova (2007) ﬁnd that higher minimum wages reduce educa-
tional attainment among the young, and that individuals exposed to higher minimum
wages work and earn less than their peers. Sutch (2010) ﬁnds that minimum wages
induce more human capital formation.6
Theoretical explanations either rely on exogenous skill-biased technical change or
on exogenously increasing relative supply of high-skilled workers; to my knowledge
this is the ﬁrst paper where both the bias of technology and skill formation are en-
dogenous.7 Caselli (1999), Galor and Moav (2000) and ´ Abrah´ am (2008) allow for en-
dogenous skill formation and explore the effects of exogenous skill-biased technical
change. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) develop a general equilibrium model
6A related debate is on the effects of minimum wages on formal on-the-job training; see, for example,
Acemoglu and Pischke (2003), Acemoglu (2003), Pischke (2005) and Neumark and Wascher (2001).
7My paper more generally connects to the literature on the effects of labour market institutions on
investments, which mainly focus on the differences in the European and American patterns (Beaudry
and Green (2003), Alesina and Zeira (2006), Koeniger and Leonardi (2007)). Another strand of literature
that relates to my paper analyses the effects of labour market distortions on growth and educational
attainment, for example Cahuc and Michel (1996) and Ravn and Sorensen (1999).
7with endogenous skill formation, physical capital accumulation, and heterogeneous
human capital to explain rising wage inequality. In this framework they ﬁnd that skill-
biased technical change explains the patterns of skill premium and overall inequality
rather well. Explanations for the skill-bias of technology rely on exogenous shifts in
the relative labour supplies. Acemoglu (1998) and Kiley (1999) use the market size
effect in research and development, while Krusell, Ohanian, R´ ıos-Rull, and Violante
(2000) rely on capital-skill complementarity and an increasing supply of high-skilled
labour to account for the path of the skill premium.
3 The Model
I begin by describing the model’s production technologies, the R&D sector, the
demographic structure and educational choices. Next I deﬁne the decentralized equi-
librium, and ﬁnally, I analyse the balanced growth path and the transitional dynamics.
3.1 Overview
Time is inﬁnite and discrete, indexed by t = 0;1;2::. The economy is populated by
a continuum of individuals who survive from one period to the next with probability
, and in every period a new generation of measure 1    is born. Individuals are
heterogeneous in two aspects: in their time cost of acquiring education and in their
innate ability.
In the ﬁrst period of his life every individual has to decide whether to acquire ed-
ucation or not, with the time to complete education varying across individuals. Those
who acquire education become high-skilled. In my calibration I identify the high-
skilled as having attended college. Those who opt out from education remain low-
skilled. Workers with high and low skills perform different tasks, are employed in
different occupations, and produce different goods. The high-skilled sector includes
skill-intensive occupations and production using high-skilled labour, while the low-
skilled sector includes labour-intensive occupations and production using low-skilled
labour. In equilibrium working in the high-skilled sector provides higher wages and
8greater protection from unemployment.
The government imposes a minimum wage in every period, and those who would
receive a lower wage – depending on their skill and innate ability – cannot work and
become unemployed. As soon as the minimum wage falls below their marginal pro-
ductivity, they immediately become employed in the sector relevant to their skill.
There is a unique ﬁnal good in this economy, which is used for consumption, the
production of machines, and as an investment in R&D. It is produced by combining
the two types of intermediate goods: one produced by the low- and the other by the
high-skilled workers. Intermediate goods are produced in a perfectly competitive en-
vironment by the relevant labour and the machines developed for them.
Technological progress takes the form of quality improvements of machines that
complement a speciﬁc type of labour, either high- or low-skilled. R&D ﬁrms can invest
in developing new, higher quality machines. Innovators own a patent for machines
and enjoy monopoly proﬁts until it is replaced by a higher quality machine. There is
free entry into the R&D sector, and more investment will be allocated to developing
machines that are complementary with the more abundant labour type.
The economy is in a decentralized equilibrium at all times: all ﬁrms maximize
their proﬁts – either in perfect competition or as a monopoly – and individuals make
educational decisions to maximize their lifetime income. I analyse how a permanent
unexpected drop in the minimum wage affects the steady state and the transitional
dynamics within this equilibrium framework.
3.2 Production
The production side of the model is a discrete time version of Acemoglu (1998).
It is a two-sector endogenous growth model, where technological advances feature a
market size effect, by which more R&D investment is allocated to develop machines
complementary to the more abundant factor.
3.2.1 Final and intermediate goods










where Yl is the intermediate good produced by the low-skilled workers and Yh is the
intermediate good produced by high-skilled workers. The elasticity of substitution
between the two intermediates is 1=(1   ), with   1. Perfect competition implies









Normalizing the price of the ﬁnal good to one implies that the price of intermediate



















Intermediate good production is also perfectly competitive in both sectors s 2
fl;hg. I simplify notation by allowing a representative ﬁrm:
Y s = As(Ns) for s = fl;hg; (4)
where  2 (0;1), Ns is the amount of effective labour employed and As is the tech-
nology level in sector s.8 Productivity of labour is endogenous and depends on the
quantity and quality of machines used. There is a continuum j 2 [0;1] of machines
used in sector s. High- and low-skilled workers use different technologies in the sense
that they use a different set of machines. Firms decide the quantity, xs;j of a machine




0 qs;j(xs;j)1 dj for s 2 fl;hg:
Notice that even in the short run, productivity is not completely rigid. Produc-
8See labour supply section for exact deﬁnition of Ns.
10tivity, As depends on the quality of machines and the quantity of each machine used.
Producers of intermediate goods choose the quantity of machines (xs;j) depending on
the price and on the supply of effective labour it complements (Ns).
Since intermediate good production is perfectly competitive, industry demand for







Ns for s = fl;hg and j 2 [0;1]: (5)
3.2.2 R&D ﬁrms
Technological advances are a discrete time version of Aghion and Howitt (1992).
Investment in R&D produces a random sequence of innovations. Each innovation
improves the quality of an existing line of machine by a ﬁxed factor, q > 1. The Poisson
arrival rate of innovations for a ﬁrm k that invested z
j
k on line j is z
j
k. Denoting the




k, the economy wide arrival rate of innovations
in line j is zj. Hence the probability that the quality of line j improves in one period
is (1   e zj). In Section A.1 of the Appendix I show that the probability that the
innovation is performed by ﬁrm k is (1   e zj)z
j
k=zj. The cost of investing z
j
k units
in R&D is Bqz
j
k in terms of ﬁnal good. There are two key features to note: one is that
the probability of success is increasing and concave in total investment, zj, the other
is that the cost of investment is increasing in the quality of the machine line. The ﬁrst
feature guarantees the existence of an interior solution, while the second guarantees
the existence of a steady state.
Notice that the probability of success for any single ﬁrm depends not only on their
own R&D expenditure, but also on the total expenditure of other ﬁrms. There are
many R&D ﬁrms, each of them small enough to take the total R&D spending as given
when deciding how much to invest. There is free entry into the R&D sector: anyone
can invest in innovation.
R&D ﬁrms with a successful invention have perpetual monopoly rights over the
machine they patented. In Section A.2 of the Appendix I show that if quality improve-
ments are sufﬁciently large, then even if the second highest quality machine were sold
at marginal cost, ﬁrms would prefer to buy the best quality machine, the leading vin-
11tage at the monopoly price. I assume that this condition applies, therefore the price of
the leading vintage in line j and sector s with quality q is:
s;j =
q
1  for s = fl;hg and j 2 [0;1]:
Hence, if quality improvements are large enough, then each machine’s productive
life is limited. Once a higher quality machine is invented producers of intermediate
goods switch to using the highest quality machine.
Monopoly pricing and industry demand (5) yield the following per period proﬁt
for the owner of the leading vintage in line j and sector s:




Ns for s = fl;hg and j 2 [0;1]: (6)
The per period proﬁt depends on the price of the intermediate good that the machine
produces, and on the efﬁciency units of labour that can use the machine. A higher
price of the intermediate good and a higher supply of effective labour, generates a
greater demand for the machine. The second component drives the scale effect in R&D.
A higher per period proﬁt means a higher lifetime value from owning a patent, which
implies more investment into improving that machine.
The value of owning the leading vintage is the expected discounted value of all
future proﬁts. This in turn depends on the per period proﬁt and the probability that
this quality remains the leading vintage in the following periods.




t (q) = 
j;s





t+1(q) for s = fl;hg and j 2 [0;1]: (7)





t (q) is the probability that quality q remains the leading vintage in line j in period
t + 1. The present value of owning the leading vintage of quality q in line j and sector




The value of owning a leading vintage is increasing in current period proﬁt and in
12the continuation value of owning this vintage. It is decreasing in the amount of R&D
spending targeted at improving quality in this line of machines.
Free entry into the R&D sector implies that all proﬁt opportunities are exhausted.






















k for s = fl;hg and j 2 [0;1] (8)
The left hand side is the expected return of investing z
j;s
k in R&D, while the right hand
side is the cost. The expected return depends on the discounted value of owning the
leading vintage, and on the probability that ﬁrm k makes a successful innovation. No-
ticethatboththeexpectedreturnandthecostsareproportionaltotheR&Dinvestment
of ﬁrm k. Hence, in equilibrium, only the total amount of R&D spending targeted at
improving line j in sector s is determined.
3.2.3 Technology and Prices
Given monopoly pricing the equilibrium production of intermediate goods is:
Y s













t dj is the average quality of the leading vintages in sector s. The




















dj for s = fl;hg: (10)













































Note that the relative price – the price of the intermediate produced by the high-skilled
compared to the one produced by the low-skilled – is decreasing in the relative supply
of high-skilled labour and in the relative quality of the machines used by high-skilled
workers. If the relative share of the high-skilled or the relative quality of the ma-
chines that complement them increases, then their production increases compared to
the production of the low-skilled labour. This leads to a fall in the relative price of the
intermediate produced by the high-skilled.
3.3 Labour supply
In this section I describe the labour supply side of the model. I assume that the
only reason for unemployment is productivity below the minimum wage. I further
assume that the only incentive for acquiring education is the higher lifetime earnings
it provides. Education increases earnings potentially through two channels: a higher
wage in periods of employment, and better employment opportunities for high- than
for low-skilled individuals. These incentives and the minimum wage determine the
optimal education decision of people, depending on their cost and return to education.
Individuals are heterogeneous in two aspects: in their cost of acquiring education,
c and in their innate ability, a. Let f(c;a) be the joint time invariant distribution of
abilities and education costs at birth.9 The demographic structure is as in Blanchard
(1985): every period a new generation of mass 1    is born, while the probability of
surviving from period t to t+1 is . These assumptions imply that both the size of the
population and the joint distribution of costs and abilities are constant over time.
Each individual has to decide whether to acquire education in the ﬁrst period of his
life. Only those born in period t can enrol to study in period t. Completing education
takes a fraction ci of the ﬁrst period of individual i’s life, and during this time, he
9I explain why I introduce heterogeneous time cost in Section 5.2.
14cannot participate in the labour market.10 The time cost of education is idiosyncratic
and is determined at birth. An individual who completes education becomes high-
skilled and has the option of working in the high-skilled sector for life. High-skilled
workers with ability a earn wage wh
t (a) in period t. Those who choose not to acquire
education, remain low-skilled and can start working in the period they are born as
low-skilled. The wage in period t for a low-skilled worker with ability a is wl
t(a).
Imodelinnateabilityasafactorthatincreasesindividualproductivity. Eachworker
supplies one unit of raw labour inelastically, which translates to a units of efﬁciency
labour for someone with ability a.
Using monopoly pricing and the implied demand for machines, the wage can be
expressed in terms of the average quality of machines:
ws






t for s = fl;hg: (13)
Since ability is equivalent to efﬁciency units of labour, it can be separated from other
factors determining the wage. Let ws






t denote the wage per
efﬁciency unit of labour in sector s in period t.
The government imposes a minimum wage wt in every period. Nobody is allowed
to earn less than the minimum wage, hence those with marginal product below the
minimum wage in period t are unemployed in period t. People only remain unem-
ployed while their marginal productivity is below the minimum wage.
This implies that for both skill levels, there is a cutoff ability in every period below





t for s = fl;hg (14)
Workers with innate ability a  as
t work in sector s in period t.11
Individuals choose their education level to maximize the present value of their
10In the calibration exercise I set the length of a period to be ﬁve years.
11If the wage per efﬁciency unit for the high- and the low-skilled were equal, than some high skilled
could work in the low-skilled sector. However, I later show that in equilibrium wh
t > wl
t for all t.









where ut+j is their consumption of the ﬁnal good,  is the probability of staying alive
until the next period, r is the discount rate, which is also the interest rate due to linear
utility.
Consider the decision of an individual with ability a and cost c born in period
t. Denote the expected present value of lifetime income by Wh
t (a;c) if high-skilled,
and by Wl
t(a;c) if low-skilled; periods of zero income account for the possibility of






t (a;c)  Wl
t(a;c)
0 if Wh
t (a;c) < Wl
t(a;c)
(15)
where e(a;c)t = 1 if the individual acquires education and e(a;c)t = 0 otherwise.
Let d(a)s
t be an indicator that takes the value one if an individual with skill s and
ability a has marginal product higher than the minimum wage in period t, and zero
otherwise. The lifetime earnings of an educated individual can be expressed as:
W
h
















Acquiring education takes a fraction, c, of the ﬁrst period of an individual’s life, im-
plying that he can only work in the remaining fraction, 1   c, of the ﬁrst period. The
lifetime earnings of a high-skilled individual are decreasing in c, the time acquiring
education takes him. The more time he spends acquiring education, the less time he
has to earn money.















Notice that the lifetime earnings of a low-skilled worker do not depend on c, while the
16earnings of a high-skilled worker are decreasing in c. This gives rise to a cutoff rule in
c for acquiring education.
Education is worth the investment for an individual with ability a and cost c if
W h
t (a;c) > W l
t(a;c). As described earlier, there are two channels through which edu-
cation can increase lifetime earnings: either the wage per efﬁciency unit is higher for
high-skilled than for low-skilled workers, or being high-skilled offers greater protec-
tion against unemployment. The second case arises when a is such that awl
t < wt <
awh
t , which also requires that wl
t < wh
t . Hence the following remark:
Remark 1. To have high-skilled individuals in a generation born in period t, there has to be
at least one period s  t, such that the wage per efﬁciency unit of labour is higher for the
high-skilled than for the low-skilled: wl
s < wh
s.
This implies that the only reason for acquiring skills is the skill premium, a higher
wage per efﬁciency unit in the high- than the low-skilled sector. Using the relative
price of intermediates, (12) and the wage per efﬁciency unit, (13), the skill premium


















The above equation shows the ways in which education increases workers’ wages.
The ﬁrst, represented by , arises because goods produced by high- and low-skilled
workers are not weighed equally in ﬁnal good production. If  > 1, the high-skilled
intermediate contributes more to the ﬁnal good, and the overall productivity of the
high-skilled, measured in units of ﬁnal good is greater. The second source is the dif-
ferent quality machines: Qh is the average quality in the high-skilled, and Ql is the
average quality in the low-skilled sector. If technology for the high-skilled is more ad-
vanced, then teaching workers to use these more advanced technologies makes work-
ers more productive. The ﬁnal source is decreasing returns in production: if the share
of high-skilled workers is very low, their relative marginal productivity becomes very
high.
The labour supply aggregates Nh
t and Nl
t are the total amount of high- and low-
17skilled efﬁciency units of labour available in period t:
N
l






























Recall that high-skilled workers born in period t only work for a fraction (1   c) of
period t, since they spend a fraction c studying.
4 Equilibrium
In this section I deﬁne the equilibrium of the economy and show that the steady state
is fully characterized by two unemployment thresholds and a cutoff time cost for ac-
quiring education. I also show that a lower minimum wage implies a shift in all three
thresholds. These shifts lead to steady state changes in both the observed skill pre-
mium and the overall wage inequality. Inequality is affected mostly through composi-
tion: theabilitycompositioninbothskillgroupsandtheskillcompositionatallpercentiles
along the wage distribution are altered.
The economy is in a decentralized equilibrium at all times; that is, all ﬁrms max-
imize proﬁts and all individuals maximize their lifetime utility given a sequence of
minimum wages.
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given, such that the following conditions are satisﬁed:
1. the effective labour supplies satisfy (19) and (18)
182. lifetime earnings are as in (16) and (17)
3. the average quality in sector s evolves according to (10)
4. total R&D investment z
j;s
t satisﬁes (8) for all t  0 and all j 2 [0;1]




6. the price sequence fph
t;pl
tg1
t=0 satisﬁes (2) and the relative price, pt satisﬁes (12)
7. the optimal education decisions, fe(a;c)tg1
t=0 are as in (15)





As is standard in the literature, in this section I focus on steady states or balanced
growth paths (BGP), which are decentralized equilibria, where all variables are con-
stant or grow at a constant rate. In Section B of the Appendix I solve for the BGP in
detail, here I present a more informal discussion.
In the BGP the total R&D spending on all lines within a sector are equal, zj;s = zs





Ns = Bzs (1+r e zs
)
1 e zs for s = fl;hg: (20)
The above equation shows that R&D effort in a sector is increasing in the period proﬁt
from machine sales. These proﬁts are higher if the price of the intermediate produced
by it, ps, is higher, or if more effective labour, Ns, uses this technology.
Along the BGP, relative quality in the two sectors, Q, has to be constant, which
requires equal R&D spending in the two sectors: zh = zl = z. From (20) R&D























The above two equations are the key to understanding the dynamics of the skill
premium. The skill premium, which is the ratio of the high- to low-skilled wage per
efﬁciency unit, depends on the relative price of the intermediates and the relative qual-
ity in the two sectors. Since both of these ratios depend on the relative supply of skills,
their interaction determines the effect of relative skill supply on the skill premium.
Equation (21) shows that the relative price of the two intermediates depends nega-
tively on the relative supply of high-skilled workers. If there are more high-skilled
workers, high-skilled intermediate production is greater, other things being equal.
The technology effect reinforces this, since more R&D is directed towards the larger
sector (from (22)), implying a higher relative quality, Q. Intuitively, having more
high-skilled workers and better technologies, leads to more high-skilled intermediate
production, and lowers the relative price of the intermediate.
Equation (22) shows that the relative quality level depends on the relative abun-
dance of the two types of labour along the balanced growth path. The average quality
in the high-skilled sector relative to the low-skilled sector depends positively on the
relative supply of high-skilled workers. With more high-skilled workers, an innova-
tion in the high-skilled sector is more proﬁtable. Hence technology is more skill-biased
– Q is greater, – if the relative supply of skills is higher.
Note that along the steady state, technological change is not biased towards either
sector, the skill-bias of technology is constant, since both sectors are growing at the
same rate. As pointed out earlier, total R&D investment in the two sectors is equal,
hence the relative quality of the two sectors is constant along the balanced growth
path.























20The wage per efﬁciency unit of labour depends on two components: the price of the
intermediategoodandtheaveragequalityofmachinesinthatsector. Sincetherelative
price depends negatively, while the relative quality depends positively on the relative
supply of skilled workers, the net effect depends on which inﬂuences the wages more.
This ultimately depends on the elasticity of substitution between the two inter-
mediates. If the two intermediates are highly substitutable,  is higher, and relative
output affects relative price less; hence the price effect is smaller. On the other hand,
if they are not substitutable and  is low, the price effect is stronger than the quality
effect. If ()=(1   )   1 > 0, then the skill premium per efﬁciency unit of labour
is an increasing function of the relative supply of skills. In this case, the increase in
relative quality more than compensates for the decrease in relative price. Hence, an
increase in the relative supply of skills increases the skill premium, implying that tech-
nology is strongly biased. If ()=(1   )   1 < 0 then the skill premium per efﬁciency
unit of labour is decreasing in the relative supply, and technology is weakly biased: the
technology effect does not compensate for the price effect.
The skill premium per efﬁciency unit of labour is not the same as the empirically












where ah is the average ability among the high-skilled and al is the average ability
among the low-skilled.
Theskillpremiumperefﬁciencyunitisconstantfrom(23). FromRemark1, theskill
premium has to be greater than one in at least one period. This implies that wh
t > wl
t
for all t  0.
The threshold ability of unemployment for the low-skilled is deﬁned in (14). Com-













Note that for the existence of a BGP, it is required that the minimum wage grows at the
21same rate as the low-skilled wage per efﬁciency unit, g. Since the growth in average




has to be constant for a steady state.








As pointed out earlier, the skill premium is greater than one, implying that the
threshold ability for unemployment for the low-skilled is higher than the threshold
ability for the high-skilled: ah < al. Acquiring skills through education, for instance
learning how to use different machines, increases workers’ productivity and protects
them from unemployment. Acquiring skills allows people with low ability to increase
their marginal productivity above the minimum wage, and to ﬁnd employment.
In the steady state everyone has a constant employment status: they are either
unemployed or employed in the low- or high-skilled sector. Moreover, depending
on their innate ability, a, everyone falls into one of the following categories: a < ah,
a 2 [ah;al) or a  al.
Consider an individual with ability a < ah. He does not acquire education in
equilibrium because he would be unemployed regardless of his skills.
Now consider an individual with ability a 2 [ah;al). If he does not acquire edu-
cation, he becomes unemployed and earns zero income in every period. On the other
hand, by completing his studies he earns the high-skilled wage. Since the opportunity
cost of education is zero in this case, acquiring education to become high-skilled is the
optimal decision.
Finally, consider an individual with ability a  al, who is always employed re-
gardless of his skill level. Such an individual acquires education if the present value of
his earnings as high-skilled (16) exceed his present value earnings as low-skilled (17).
Result 1. Every individual with ability a  al born in period t acquires education if his cost












Proof. Combining (15) with (16) and (17) and using that in equilibrium ds
t+k(a) = 1 for






















This shows that the optimal education decision is equivalent to a threshold time cost,
c
t. Using the fact that wages in both sectors grow at a constant rate g, and that the
skill premium, wh
t =wl
t is constant, c
t = c is constant and given by (26).
The threshold time cost for acquiring education and consequently the fraction of
high-skilled workers depends positively on the skill premium and on the growth rate
oftheaveragequalities. Thethresholdisincreasingintheskillpremium, sinceahigher
skill premium implies a greater per period gain from working as high-skilled. The
growth rate of wages also increases the threshold time cost; if wages grow at a higher










Figure 3: Optimal education
Notes: The horizontal axis represents the support of the ability distribution, and the vertical axis
represents the support of the cost distribution.
Figure 3 depicts educational choices in the steady state. Individuals with ability
23lower than ah are unemployed and do not acquire education (U). Between the two
thresholds, ah  a < al, everyone acquires education and becomes high-skilled to
avoid unemployment. Finally individuals with ability above al acquire skills if their
time cost is below c.
The three cutoff values determine the effective labour supplies, Nh and Nl. In
turn, the effective labour supplies determine every other variable in the economy
in steady state. Therefore, the steady state of the economy is characterized by the
three thresholds ah;al and c. Furthermore, the three thresholds are also connected
through the equilibrium condition (25). This condition relates the two cutoff values of
unemployment through the skill premium.
Lemma 1. The pair (al;c) uniquely deﬁnes ah.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
The balanced growth path is deﬁned by two key equations: the equilibrium c
given the threshold for low-skilled unemployment (26) and the equilibrium al given






















Figure 4: Steady state
The curve CC represents the equilibrium c for different values of al (26). The
threshold ability for low-skilled unemployment affects c through two channels. The
ﬁrst is the growth rate: a higher al decreases the total amount of effective labour in the
24economy. Due to scale effects in R&D, this reduces the growth rate of the economy.12 A
lower growth rate implies a lower lifetime gain from being high-skilled, hence a lower
c.
The second channel is the skill premium. A higher al reduces Nl and increases
Nh, so the relative supply of high-skilled workers increases. A weak technology bias
reduces the skill premium, and the gain from acquiring education; thus, a higher al
reduces c both through its affect on growth and on the skill premium, so the curve
represented by CC is downward sloping.
On the other hand if technology is strongly biased, then an increase in Nh=Nl increases
the skill premium. The decreasing growth rate pushes c down, while the increasing
skill premium pushes c up. The overall effect on the gain from education can be
ambiguous if technology is strongly biased. For the range of values that are of interest,
the overall effect is small and negative.
The curve AA represents the equilibrium unemployment threshold al for different
valuesofc(24). Ifcishigher, therearemorehigh-skilledworkers, andtheirproduction
increases. This, in turn, depresses the price of their intermediate, ph, while the price
of the low-skilled intermediate increases. A higher pl allows workers with both lower
ability and skills to participate in the market. Hence the threshold for unemployment
for the low-skilled is a decreasing function of c, implying the downward sloping AA
curve in Figure 4.
4.2 Lowering the minimum wage
To analyse the effects of minimum wage on inequality, I consider an unanticipated
permanent decrease in the normalized minimum wage. A lower minimum wage ex-
cludes fewer people from the labour market, by lowering the unemployment thresh-
old for both the high- and the low-skilled. Moreover, through endogenous R&D, the
increase in the supply of effective labour raises the growth rate of the economy, thus
increasing the incentives to acquire education, resulting in a higher cutoff cost for ac-
quiring education. The shift of these three thresholds changes the ability composition
12See Appendix section B.3 for the exact dependence of the growth rate on the supply of high- and
low-skilled effective labour.
25in both sectors and the skill composition along the ability distribution. Average abil-
ity in both sectors decreases, with high-skilled average ability decreasing less. The
fraction of high-skilled workers changes at every percentile in the wage distribution,
increasing at the top end and decreasing at the bottom end, thereby increasing overall
inequality.
The normalized minimum wage shifts curve AA and leaves curve CC unaffected.
From (24) a lower e w implies that a lower al satisﬁes the equation for any c. Therefore,
a higher normalized minimum wage shifts the curve up, and a lower value shifts the
curve down.
Curve BB in Figure 4 represents the equilibrium unemployment threshold al for
any cutoff time cost of education for a lower e w. The steady state moves from O1 to O2.
The new steady state features a lower threshold for unemployment, al
1 and a higher
threshold for the time cost of education, c
1. The effect of these changes on the supply


















Figure 5: Change in the optimal education and labour market participation
Notes: In the graph I represent a case where [ah
1 ;al
1 ] and [ah
0 ;al
0 ] do not overlap. I chose to show
such a case, since this is what I ﬁnd in the calibration exercise.
The direct effect of an increase in c is to decrease Nl and increase Nh. A higher c
implies that more people acquire education for higher wages. The fraction of low-
skilled workers decreases while the fraction of high-skilled increases among those
with ability greater than al
0 .
A lower al entails that fewer people acquire education to avoid unemployment.
26While previously everyone with ability, a 2 [ah
0 ;al
0 ) became high-skilled to avoid
unemployment, now they would be employed regardless of their skill level. Only
those with cost lower than c
1 acquire education. This increases Nl partly by reducing
Nh and partly by reducing unemployment.
A decrease in al also implies a lower ah, which increases Nh by reducing unem-
ployment. A lower unemployment cutoff for the high-skilled shifts down the range of
abilities for which people acquire education to avoid unemployment.
The overall effect of a decrease in the minimum wage on the relative supply of
skills depends on the elasticity of al relative to the elasticity of c. The change in the
supply of high and low skills governs the change in the skill premium as well.
In general, the effect of minimum wages on the supply of skills is ambiguous.
However, numerical results suggest that a lower minimum wage increases the supply
of high-skilled less than it increases the supply of low-skilled effective labour, lead-
ing to a decrease in the relative supply of skills. The calibration exercise presented in
Section 5 yields that technology is strongly biased; hence, a reduction in the supply of
skills decreases the skill premium per efﬁciency unit of labour.
Overall inequality in the economy, measured by the wage gap between different
percentiles of the wage distribution, increases. With a lower minimum wage the range
of abilities in the labour market widens, and the fraction of high-skilled increases at
the top end of the ability distribution, and decreases at the bottom end. These forces
both push towards greater inequality.
5 Calibration
I ﬁrst present estimates of the parameters set outside the model. I then present
maximum likelihood estimates of the ability and time cost of education distributions,
based on the equilibrium conditions of the model. Finally, I calibrate the remaining
parameters by globally minimizing the distance between data moments and steady
state moments of the model.
275.1 Interest rate, lifespan and production technology
Three parameters, namely, the share of labour in the production function, , the
interest rate, r, and the survival probability, , can be set outside the model.
The intermediate good is produced by labour and machines, and the exponent on
labour is . This implies a wage bill of Y in the aggregate economy. Since the wage
bill has been roughly constant at 2
3 over long run US history, I set  = 2
3.
The interest rate and the probability of survival depend on the length of a period
in the model. Since people can spend only a fraction of their ﬁrst period studying in
the model, I set one period in the model to correspond to ﬁve years.13
BasedontherealinterestrateintheUS,whichhasbeenaboutﬁvepercentannually,
I set the interest rate for ﬁve years to be r = 1:055   1.
On average, since people spend 45 years working and studying, the rate of survival
can be set to give an expected 9 periods of work, including the period of study.14 This
gives the value  = 1   1
9.
5.2 Ability and cost distribution
Estimating the distribution of abilities and costs is a crucial part of the calibration
exercise. Since ability and the cost of education are not directly observable, I combine
equilibrium conditions of the model with observable characteristics such as wages,
education levels and age to estimate these distributions.
Figure 6, which represents the hourly wages of high- and low-skilled individuals,
offers a good starting point for identifying the ability and cost of education distribu-
tions. A striking feature in the ﬁgure is the signiﬁcant overlap between the wages of
the two educational groups. An appropriate distribution, therefore, must reproduce
this pattern.
13A longer model period would also allow for completing education in one period. However, shorter
periods provide richer transitional dynamics.
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Figure 6: Hourly wages of the high- and low-skilled in 1981
Notes: Wages are calculated from the CPS MORG supplements. Wages are the exponent of the residu-
als from regressing log hourly wage on age, age square, sex and race. Those who attended college are
high-skilled, everyone else is low-skilled. The lines represent the kernel density estimate produced by
Stata.
In general there are two components to the cost of education: a time cost and a
consumption cost. The time cost arises because a person can work part-time at most
while studying. The consumption cost is due to tuition fees and other expenses. Both
these costs could be thought of as homogeneous or heterogeneous across individu-
als. For example, a model with credit constraints and differential endowments would
yield a heterogeneous education cost in reduced form. I consider three cases—a ho-
mogeneous cost, a distribution of consumption costs and ﬁnally a distribution of time
costs—and show that only heterogeneous time costs of education can reproduce the
overlapping wages.15 Therefore in the calibration and in the numerical results I as-
sume that the cost of education is purely an idiosyncratic time cost.
First, consider the case with a homogeneous consumption cost of acquiring edu-
cation. In this case, the returns to education are increasing in ability, while the cost
is ﬁxed. In equilibrium there is a cutoff ability above which people acquire educa-
15For sake of brevity in the discussion of the various cases I only consider the decision of those indi-
viduals, who acquire education for higher wages and not to avoid unemployment. In all cases, there
would be a range of abilities at the very bottom end of the ability distribution, where some people
would acquire education to avoid unemployment, while the rest would be unemployed.
29tion, and below which they do not. Since both ability and wage per efﬁciency unit are
higher for high-skilled individuals, equilibrium choices imply higher wages for high-
skilled individuals. Wage distributions in this setup would not overlap, contradicting
the empirically observed pattern.16
Second, assuming a distribution of consumption costs does not ﬁt the empirical
pattern of overlapping wage distributions either. A distribution of consumption costs
implies a cutoff cost for every ability level in equilibrium. Given the cutoff for an
ability level, those with the respective ability and lower cost of education acquire edu-
cation, while those with cost higher than the cutoff do not. The equilibrium cutoff cost
is increasing in ability: people with higher ability, have higher returns from educa-
tion and are willing to pay a higher consumption cost for education. This implies that
the fraction of high-skilled is increasing in the ability level, implying a higher average
ability among the high-skilled. As in the previous case, high-skilled individuals have
higher wages due to a higher unit wage and higher average abilities, contradicting the
overlapping wage distribution pattern.17
Third, assuming instead, that the cost of education is a time cost, the equilibrium
cutoff cost for acquiring education is independent of ability. If the ability and cost dis-
tributions are independent, then the high-skilled have higher wages only because of
higher unit wages, since the average ability in the two sectors are equal. The distribu-
tion of wages for the high-skilled is a shifted and compressed version of the distribu-
tion of wages for the low-skilled. Hence, in this case predictions on the distribution
of wages in the high- and low-skilled sector match well with the pattern observed in
Figure 6. Therefore in the calibration and in the numerical results I assume that the
cost of education is purely an idiosyncratic time cost.
For simplicity I assume that ability and education costs are independently dis-
tributed. I assume a uniform time cost distribution on [0;c], with c  1, allowing
16If the homogeneous cost was a time cost, everyone would need to be indifferent between acquiring
education or not. Since both the cost and the returns to education are linearly increasing in ability,
if people were not indifferent then either everyone would acquire education or nobody would. An
equilibrium based on indifference cannot be estimated from the data, since the ability, and therefore the
wages of high- and low-skilled individuals are indeterminate in equilibrium.
17Thisholdsevenwhentheabilityandcostdistributionsareindependent. Withanegativecorrelation
between ability and the consumption cost of education, the two wage distributions would overlap even
less.
30a maximum of ﬁve years for studies if c = 1. The probability density function is
g(c) = 1=c. I assume that ability is lognormally distributed, with probability density
function f(a) = 1
a(
ln(a) 
 ), where  is the pdf of the standard normal distribution.
Since all variables of interest in the steady state calibration and in the quantita-
tive assessment of the transition are invariant to the mean of the ability distribution, I
normalize this mean to be one.18
In the model, the wage of an individual with ability ai and education s is given by
ws(ai) = aiws, while the average wage in sector s is ws = asws, where as is the average
ability among those with education s, and ws is the wage per efﬁciency unit in sector




ws  e a
s
i:
An individual’s ability relative to the average ability in his education group is equal
to his wage relative to the average wage in that sector. Since the education and wages
of every respondent in the sample are recorded, I can infer relative ability, e as
i, from the
data.
If the distribution of time costs and abilities is known, cutoff values for unemploy-
ment, ah;al and time cost c can be found by matching the fractions of unemployed,
low- and high-skilled workers. The thresholds ah;al and c, and the parameters of
the ability and cost distributions are sufﬁcient to calculate the average ability in both
education groups, ah;al (see Figure 3 and Appendix C.1).
Multiplying the relative ability of a person by the average ability in his education








According to the model, if a high-skilled individual i’s wage is lower than a low-
18This normalization is equivalent to:
E(a) = e+ 1
2
2
= 1 ,  =  1
22
Furthermore, in any model, where agents are heterogeneous in ability, the mean of the ability distribu-
tion and the technology level are not separable along any observable measure. Since this setup does
not require the absolute level of technology, or the mean of the ability distribution for any quantity of
interest, this normalization is without loss of generality.
31skilled individual’s wage, and since the skill premium is greater than one, it follows







Similarly, the ability of any low-skilled individual has to be higher than the ability of







A high-skilled individual has wage wh




whah, and he acquired
education either to avoid unemployment, or because his time cost is lower than the
threshold, ci  c. If he is in the ﬁrst period of his life, his time cost of education
must be lower than the maximum amount of time he could have spent studying. The
probability of observing a high-skilled individal with wage wh
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Since there is an upper bound on the ability a high-skilled individual can have, the
likelihood of observing a given wage, wh
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(27)
Similarly, a low-skilled individual earning wage wl





exceeding the cutoff time cost; al
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The likelihood of observing wage wl
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I calculate the likelihood of observing the sample of wage and education pairs us-
ing (27) and (28). I maximise the likelihood by choosing parameters  and c.
I use the May and Outgoing Rotation Group supplements of the Current Popu-
lation Survey for 1981. I choose 1981 as the initial steady state because from 1982
onwards, the minimum wage was not adjusted by inﬂation, and its real value started
declining. I divide the population into high- and low-skilled based on college educa-
tion: those who attended college are high-skilled, those who did not are low-skilled. I
calculate the fraction of unemployed, low-skilled and high-skilled workers using the
education and the employment status categories .19 In order to capture only the effects
of education and underlying ability, I use a cleaned measure of wage. This measure is
the exponent of the residuals generated from regressing log hourly wages on age, age
square, sex and race.
The maximum likelihood yields  = 0:73 and c = 0:82, which corresponds to about
four years.
5.3 Final good production and R&D
I calibrate the remaining parameters to minimize the distance between moments
of the initial steady state and the same moments from the data. It is common in cali-
bration exercises to match n moments exactly by choosing n parameters, and use the
remaining moments to test the goodness of ﬁt of the model. In this method the pa-
rameters chosen depend heavily on which moments are matched, and the choice of
these moments are rather arbitrary. The method I use, which is similar to a method of
19In the calibration I do not make a distinction in the educational attainment of the unemployed. In
the steady state, only those who will be employed in the future should acquire education. In the data,












moments estimation, is to choose the values of 6 parameters to minimize the weighted
distance from 9 moments of the data. The weight of the ith moment, is the estimated
standard deviation of the ith moment in the data. I run a grid search over the set of
parameter values and ﬁnd the set that globally minimizes the distance from the mo-
ments.
I chose three types of moments: moments that describe the skill-composition and
fraction of unemployed in the economy, those that describe the wage distribution, and
those that reﬂect the R&D process. Moments of the ﬁrst type are important to match,
as most of the movement in the model comes from changes in these aggregates. The
second type is also crucial, since I analyse the effects of minimum wages on inequality.
Finally, matching the growth rate, which is governed by the R&D process, determines
the responsiveness of technology. The moments and the ﬁt of the model are summa-
rized in the Table 1.
I globally minimize the distance from the data moments by choosing ;;;q;B
and e w. The calibrated parameters are summarized in Table 2. Parameters  and B con-
trol the proﬁtability of R&D activity, while q,  and B together determine the growth
rates. Parameter  determines how much R&D spending increases the Poisson arrival
rate of innovations, while parameter B determines how costly R&D investments are
in terms of the ﬁnal good. The value of q determines the size of the improvement
between two quality levels over a ﬁve year period. The weight of the high-skilled
34intermediate in the production of the ﬁnal good is given by .
Table 2: Calibrated parameters
   q B e w   r c 
0.9 1.15 0.25 2.08 0.15 0.4 2/3 8/9 1:055 0.82 0.73
Parameter  controls the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate goods
produced by the high- and low-skilled. This elasticity, 1=(1   ) cannot be estimated
directlyfromthedata. Notethattheelasticityofsubstitutionbetweentheintermediate
goods is not the same as the elasticity of substitution between high- and low-skilled
workers, which has been estimated by several authors. However, their estimates are
not comparable to , since technology is usually modelled as exogenous, while in my
model it is endogenous.20
6 Transitional Dynamics
In this section I discuss the transitional dynamics following a reduction in the min-
imum wage. The transition takes relatively long as new generations have to replace
older ones, as the new steady state features a different educational composition. Dur-
ing the transition, the average skill premium and the wage gaps between different
percentiles in the wage distribution all increase. The increase is the most pronounced
in the period of the announcement, due to the entry of previously unemployed work-
ers into the labour force. Inequality measured by the skill premium and wage gaps
continues to increase throughout the transition, as both the skill composition of the
labour force and the ability composition of the two skill groups change.
Initially the economy is in steady state. The minimum wage grows at the same rate
asthewagesandthequalityinbothsectors. Thegovernmentunexpectedlyannounces
a permanent decrease in the value of the normalized minimum wage. The normalized
minimum wage drops to its new lower value in the period of the announcement, and
20See Section C.2 of the Appendix for further details.
35stays there forever. Individuals and R&D ﬁrms have perfect foresight over the future
sequenceoftheminimumwage, andformcorrectexpectationsaboutthefuturepathof
the average quality levels of machines and education acquisition of future generations.
The economy is in a decentralized equilibrium along the transitional path from the
initial BGP to the new one.
I use a second order approximation of the equations that have to hold through-
out the transition to produce the transitional dynamics (see Appendix section D for
details).21
Figure 2 shows that the real value of the minimum wage decreased by about 30
percent until the late 1980s, while the minimum wage compared to the average high-
and low-skilled wage decreased by about 20 percent. In the transitional dynamics
I mimic this pattern by a one-time 20 percent drop in the value of the normalized
minimum wage. Since in the steady state the real minimum wage is not stationary,
it is not possible to simulate a shock by changing its value while using perturbation
methods. The change in the normalized minimum wage is not necessarily the same
as the change in the minimum wage compared to the average wage, but the transition
shows that it is sufﬁciently close.22
Figure 7 shows the transitional path from the original steady state to the new one,
which features a 20 percent lower normalized minimum wage. The horizontal axis
denotes the year, with the drop in the normalized minimum wage occurring in 1981.
The top two panels in Figure 7 show the path of the unemployment thresholds. At
the moment of the announcement, both ah and al drop almost to their new steady
state value. It is not visible on the graphs, but the threshold ability for low-skilled
unemployment initially stays above its steady state value and gradually falls towards
21I use the code designed in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) to produce the transitional dynamics.




















These clearly do not imply the same dynamics for al
t, but since the magnitude of the change in both pl
t
and al
t is small, their effect will be dominated by the drop in e w throughout the transition.






















































Figure 7: Transition of the main variables
37it, while the threshold for high-skilled unemployment drops slightly below, then in-
creases to its new steady state value. Equation (24) shows that only the price of the
low-skilled intermediate affects the path of al. As the bottom left panel of Figure 7
shows, the change in the steady state price is very small, which explains the seem-
ingly immediate jump of al to its new steady state value. The movement of ah can
be understood from (25): ah follows alwl
t=wh
t , therefore the initial overshooting of the
skill premium (second row, right panel in Figure 7) explains the undershooting of ah.
The thresholds for unemployment do not change much after the initial drop because
intermediate prices and the skill premium do not change much either.
Note that the new value of al is lower than the initial ah; this suggests that those
who acquire education in order to avoid unemployment in the new steady state and
during the transition have lower ability than those who did the same in the previous
steady state.
The path of the cutoff time cost for acquiring education is shown in the left panel in
the second row of Figure 7. This threshold c initially overshoots and then decreases
monotonically towards its new steady state value, which is higher than the original
one. This pattern can be understood by looking at the path of the skill premium (sec-
ond row, right panel) and the path of the growth rates (bottom right panel). The initial
jump in the skill premium drives the overshooting of c, then as the skill premium
decreases, so does c. The monotone increase in the growth rate increases the present
value gain of being high-skilled for a given skill premium, which keeps the new steady
state value of c above the initial one.
Taking the path of the three cutoffs ah;al and c as given, the paths of the effective
supply of high- and low-skilled labour (depicted in row 4 of Figure 7) can be under-
stood. Figure 8 plots the effect of changes in the cutoffs on the high- and low-skilled
effective labour supply and on the labour market participation of individuals. The ini-
tial steady state thresholds are denoted by al
0 ;ah
0 ;c
0, while the new steady state values
are denoted by al
1 ;ah
1 ;c
1. The maximum value of c, which is reached in the period of
the announcement is denoted by c
max.
The shift in the cutoffs lead to two types of changes: in the education decisions and



























Figure 8: Change in the optimal education and labour market participation
Notes: Ability is on the horizontal axis, the time cost is on the vertical axis. The maximum of the time




while the new ones are: ah
1 ;al
1 ;c
1. I denote the maximum threshold time cost that is reached in the
period of the announcement by c
max.
those born in the period of the announcement, and in subsequent generations. This is
because the option of acquiring education is only available at birth, and individuals
are not allowed to retrain themselves in later periods. Thus, the labour supplies adjust
gradually, as new generations replace old ones, lengthening the transition period.
The only case where this is not true is for members of previous generations (for
example person C;D or D0)with ability between al
1 and ah
0 . They are low-skilled
and have been unemployed until now, but in the period of the announcement they
can immediately start working as low-skilled workers. Their entry into the workforce
instantaneously increases the supply of low-skilled workers, which is reﬂected by the
jump in Nl.
Members of the new generation with ability between al
1 and ah
0 either start work-
ing as low-skilled, as C, or enrol in education at birth, as person D or D0. People with
the same time cost as D0 will only become high-skilled if they belong to generations
born close to the initial shock, whereas people with time cost as D become high-skilled
regardless of the generation they are born in. This implies that the initial increase in
low-skilled labour supply will be diminished to some extent in future periods, as in-
dividuals similar to D become high-skilled instead of working as low-skilled. They
replace some members of the older generations who went from unemployment into
39the low-skilled workforce. The education of individuals like D increases the supply
of high-skilled workers while decreasing the supply of low-skilled workers gradually.
This is reﬂected by the gradual increase in Nh.
Consider person E from one of the new generations. He would have been unem-
ployed under the previous regime, but now can avoid unemployment by becoming
high-skilled. This is true for all members with ability in [ah
1 ;al
1 ) in the new genera-
tions. The entry of these individuals leads to a gradual increase in Nh.
Individuals similar to A and A0 would have been high-skilled with the original,
higher minimum wage in order to avoid unemployment. Under the new, lower min-
imum wage, they can work without acquiring education. Initially only individuals
with time cost as high as A remain low-skilled. Gradually as c decreases to c
1 indi-
viduals with time cost as A0 also opt out from education. The change in the education of
individuals with ability in [ah
0 ;al
0 ) and high enough education time cost gradually in-
creases the supply of low-skilled workers at the expense of the high-skilled workforce,
reﬂected in the gradual increase in Nl.
Since the cutoff time cost initially overshoots and then decreases monotonically to
its new steady state value, in generations closer to the announcement, more individu-
als become high-skilled among those with ability greater than al
1 . Consider individual
B0. If born in the period of the announcement, he acquires education. In the long run,
however, it will only be individuals with time cost as B whose education choice is
different from the choice of generations born before the change in the minimum wage.
This implies that initially individuals with higher time cost acquire education than the
new steady state implies. The education of these individuals gradually increases the
supply of the high-skilled workforce.
The left panel in row 3 of Figure 7 shows the overall effect of these changes on the
relative supply of skills, Nh=Nl: the relative supply of skills decreases on impact. This
is the result of two forces. First there is mass entry from unemployment into the low-
skilled labour force at the time of the announcement.The effect of this can be seen on
the right panel in row 4 as Nl jumps up. Second, there is entry from unemployment
into the high-skilled labour force, but the effect of this is offset to some extent by the
exit of some ability levels, Nh initially increases only slightly (left panel in row 4).
40As time passes the effect of the initial increase in the supply of low-skilled workers
is diminished, the relative supply of high-skilled workers starts increasing more, and
growth in the supply of low-skilled workers decreases. Row 4 of Figure 7 shows that
both supplies increase gradually, and both measures rise above their initial level in the
long run.
The skill premium per efﬁciency unit depends on two factors along the transitions:
the relative supply of high-skilled workers and the relative technology available. The
interaction of the two is shown in the right panel of row 2 in Figure 7: on impact the
skill premium increases. The initial decline in the relative supply of skills increases the
skill premium. This supply effect is not offset by technology, as depicted in the right
panel in row 3. Even though technology becomes less biased towards the high-skilled
workers in the long run, in the short run it does not have sufﬁcient time to react to
these changes. As the change in the relative supply is unanticipated, technology can
only adjust from the next period onwards. This explains the initial increase in both the
skill premium per efﬁciency unit of labour (right panel in row 2), and the average skill
premium (top panel of Figure 9).
From the second period on, technology adapts according to the change in relative
supplies, shown on the right panel in row 3. It reacts with a lag to the initial decline
in relative supply by undershooting, and then gradually increasing to its new steady
state value, which is slightly below the original steady state. As technology starts to
react to the change in relative supply, the skill premium drops as well, undershooting
its ﬁnal steady state value. In the long run the skill premium converges to its new
steady state value, which is slightly lower than its initial value.
The variables with empirically observable counterparts are the relative supply of
high- and low-skilled raw labour, Lh=Ll, and the average skill premium, wh=wl. The
relative raw labour supply is shown in the bottom panel of Figure 9. Its path is very
similar to that of the effective labour supply, but the magnitude of change is quite
different. This difference in magnitude is due to the difference in ability between those
who join the low-skilled and the high-skilled labour market. The measure of people
joining the low-skilled workforce is much larger than the measure of those joining the
high-skilledworkforce, reﬂectedinthesigniﬁcantoveralldeclineintherelativesupply














Figure 9: Average skill premium and relative raw labour supply
Notes: The vertical dashed line represents 2006, the year to which I am comparing the results to. The
top panel represents the change in the observed skill premium compared to its initial value, while the
bottom panel shows the path of the relative supply of raw high-skilled labour.
of raw high-skilled labour. On the other hand, the average ability of those joining
the high-skilled workforce is higher than the average of those joining the low-skilled.
This is demonstrated by the only slight long run decline in the relative supply of high-
skilled effective labour. This implies that compositional changes play an important role
in both the high-skilled and the low-skilled workforce. The average ability in both
sectors decreases, but it decreases relatively more among the low-skilled than among
the high-skilled workers.
The top panel in Figure 9 represents the change in the observed skill premium com-
pared to its initial value. The observed skill premium increases on impact and then
decreases gradually, as does the skill premium per efﬁciency unit of labour. However,
unlike the skill premium per efﬁciency unit, the average skill premium converges to
a value higher than its initial value in the long-run. This is due to compositional ef-
fects: since the average ability in the low-skilled labour force decreases more than in
the high-skilled labour force, the average skill premium increases relative to its initial
value.
42Between 1981 and 2006 the average skill premium increased by 18 percent (see
Figure 1). In the model, twenty ﬁve years after the decline in the minimum wage (at
the dashed vertical line), the increase is 2.7 percent, implying that the minimum wage
accounts for 15 percent of the increase in the observed skill premium.
The widening wage inequality is well captured by the increasing gap between the
wages of workers in the 90th, 50th and 10th percentile. Figure 10 shows the change
in these measures during the transition. The dashed vertical line represents the year
2006.

















Figure 10: Wage gaps during the transition
Notes: The vertical dashed line represents 2006, the year to which I am comparing the results to.
These wage gaps increase due to two factors: changes in the skill premium per
efﬁciency unit, and compositional effects.
Changes in the skill premium only increase inequality in the period of the an-
nouncement; from the third period onwards these changes compress the wage dis-
tribution (see Figure 7 second row right panel).
Compositional forces always put an upward pressure on inequality. One compo-
nentisthewideningrangeofabilitiespresentonthelabourmarket. Asthenormalized
minimum wage drops, the threshold abilities for unemployment decrease, increasing
the range of abilities present on the labour market. As the range of abilities widens,
43the gap between the ability level at the 90th percentile gets further away from the abil-
ity level at the 50th percentile, which gets further from the 10th percentile. The second
component is the changing ratio of high- to low-skilled workers at every percentile in
the wage distribution. The fraction of high-skilled workers among the top 10 percent
of earners increases, while their ratio at the bottom 10 percent decreases.
All three wage gaps increase the most in the period of the announcement, since the
skill premium and the compositional effects both put an upward pressure on them in
this period. After the ﬁrst period, the wage gaps widen further, but at a slower rate.
The 90/10 wage differential increases the most, while the 90/50 increases the least.
This is expected, since most of the compositional changes affect the lower end of the
wage distribution.
Note, however, that the the change in the minimum wage causes the top end of the
wage distribution to widen as well. This is mostly due to the compositional changes
both in ability and in skill levels, which affect the position of the 90th percentile and
the 50th percentile eraner differentially.
The 90/10 wage gap increased by 32 percent between 1981 and 2006, the 90/50
wage gap increased by 21 percent, and the 50/10 wage gap increased by 10 percent
(see Figure 1). The model is most successful at predicting the 50/10 wage gap - it
explains about 45 percent of the observed increase, while it explains about 18.5 percent
and 7 percent of the increase in the 90/10 and 90/50 wage gaps, respectively.
7 Decomposition
I consider three simpliﬁed versions of the model, in order to better understand the
contributions of changing technology and education to the effects of minimum wages
on the patterns of wage inequality. The ﬁrst version is one where both educational
attainment and technology are ﬁxed. In the second version, the skill composition is
endogenous, but technology is ﬁxed. The third version features ﬁxed educational at-
tainment and endogenously directed technical change.
Comparing the transitional dynamics of the four models quantitatively shows that
most of the initial effects are due to the inﬂow from unemployment into the labour
44market. The decomposition shows that in the case of endogenous education, compo-
sitional effects play an important role, and that the change in technology does not have
a quantitatively big impact on overall inequality.
7.1 Exogenous education, exogenous technology
Consider a model, where the production side is as in the model, but technology
and education are ﬁxed. Technology in the low- and the high-skilled sector is growing
at the same rate. There are high and low-skilled individuals, but the choice of acquir-
ing education is ﬁxed in other words, nobody can acquire additional education and
nobody can opt out from education. I assume that the education and employment
structure in the initial steady state is as in the full model.
If both education and technology are ﬁxed, then lowering the minimum wage af-
fects the wage distribution only through an expansion of low-skilled employment. A
lower minimum wage allows people who have been previously unemployed, and are
hence low-skilled, to enter the low-skilled labour market (see section E.1 of the Ap-
pendix). With constant technology, this decreases the wage per unit of efﬁciency for
the low-skilled, thereby increasing the skill premium. However, since education is
ﬁxed, this does not translate into an increase in the supply of high-skilled labour. The
average ability in the low-skilled sector decreases, hence the observed skill premium
increases more than the skill premium per efﬁciency unit.
In this setup there are no transitional dynamics, as low-skilled employment ex-
pands in the period of the announcement, the skill-premium responds, and there are
no further adjustments. As a consequence of a fall in the minimum wage, the supply
of low-skilled labour increases, the skill premium increases and wage gaps between
different percentiles of the distribution also increase.
7.2 Endogenous education, exogenous technology
Now consider a model where educational choices are made optimally, but tech-
nology is ﬁxed. As in the previous model, quality in the high- and the low-skilled
sector is growing at the same rate. Since education changes endogenously, I model the
45labour market side exactly as in the full model. The key difference is that since growth
is exogenous, there is no feedback from the effective labour supplies to the direction
and rate of technological improvements. Therefore, the relative supply of skills only
affects the skill premium through the price effect, as the market size effect is removed.
Hence, in this setup, the skill premium per efﬁciency unit is always decreasing in the
















The unemployment cutoffs and the threshold for acquiring education are deter-
mined exactly as in the full model (see Appendix section E.2 for details). The only
differences are that the skill premium is always decreasing in the relative supply (see
equation above) and the growth rate is exogenous and independent of the relative
supply of skills.
In the Section E.2 of the Appendix, I show that the system can be reduced to two
thresholds, al and c, as in the full model, and the two equations deﬁning the steady
state are as in Figure 5. This also implies that as in the full model, a reduction in the
minimum wage reduces the unemployment threshold in both sectors, and increases
the threshold cost of acquiring education.
In the long-run, the supply of high- and low-skilled effective labour increases, with
the relative supply of skills decreasing. This implies an increase in the skill premium
per efﬁciency unit, unlike in the full model. Moreover, the average ability in the low
skilled sector decreases more, which implies that the observed skill premium increases
more that the skill premium per efﬁciency unit. The wage gaps between different
percentiles also increase.
The transition takes a long time, as in the full model, since complete educational
adjustment takes several generations.
7.3 Exogenous education, endogenous technology
Finally, consider an economy where education is ﬁxed, but technology changes
46endogenously. In such a setup, a lower minimum wage increases the supply of low-
skilled labour, thus increasing the skill premium. This does not lead to an increase in
the supply of skills, as educational choices are ﬁxed. The average ability in the low-
skilled sector decreases, implying that the observed skill premium increases more than
the skill premium per efﬁciency unit.
Transition takes time, as technology needs to adapt to the new relative labour sup-
plies. In the long-run, technology becomes less skill-biased and the skill premium per
efﬁciency unit falls below its original value.














full model exogenous education exogenous technology exogenous educ & tech
Figure 11: The role of education and technology in the average skill premium
Notes: The vertical dashed line represents 2006, which is the ﬁnal year, to which I am comparing
the results. The colours represent: blue – full model, red – exogenous technology, endogenous educa-
tion, green – endogenous technology, exogenous education, black – exogenous technology, exogenous
education.
7.4 Decomposition results
Figures 11 and 12 show the path of the observed skill premium and wage gaps
betweendifferentpercentilesinthedistribution. Theobservedskillpremiumincreases
the most in the case of ﬁxed education and technology, both in the short- and the long-
run. This is not true for the wage gaps: the wage gaps in the short-run increase the
most in the case of ﬁxed education and technology, but in the long-run, the effects are
bigger when education is endogenous. The different pattern of the skill premium and
the wage gaps suggest that the increase in the observed skill premium is driven by the
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Figure 12: The role of education and technology in the wage gaps
Notes: The vertical dashed line represents 2006, the ﬁnal year of data. The colours represent: blue – full
model, red – exogenous technology, endogenous education, green – endogenous technology, exogenous
education, black – exogenous technology, exogenous education.
expanding employment of the low-skilled.
Theobservedskillpremiumincreasesthemostinthecaseofexogenoustechnology
and exogenous education (see Figure 11), as the increase in the supply of low-skilled
labour is the largest. With endogenous technology, the initial impact is the same, but
is diminished in the long-run as technologies become less skill-biased. When educa-
tion is endogenous, the initial impact of lowering the minimum wage is smaller. This
is due to an expansion of high-skilled employment. As low-skilled workers enter the
labour market and the skill premium increases, the incentives for acquiring education
increase, leading to an expansion of the high-skilled labour force, thus diminishing the
initial increase in the skill premium. The initial increase in the skill premium is larger
when technology is endogenous, due to the higher growth rate of the economy. An
expansion of the labour force leads to a higher growth rate in case of endogenous tech-
nology, which implies a higher lifetime gain from working in the high-skilled sector.
Therefore, if technology is endogenous, the cutoff time cost for education increases
more, leading to a larger change in average abilities and larger compositional effects.
48Figure 12 shows the patterns of wage gaps. In all three graphs, the biggest initial
impact is in the case of exogenous education, implying that most of the initial increase
is due to the inﬂow of previously unemployed workers into the low-skilled labour
market. In the long-run, the wage gaps increase the most in the case of endogenous




the widening wage inequality in the US. The real value of the minimum wage eroded
over the 1980s, losing 30 percent of its initial value. At the same time - in the early
1980s - there was an unprecedented surge in inequality. The wage gap widened be-
tween any two points in the wage distribution, and the college premium increased
sharply. However, to my knowledge, there are no attempts in the literature to assess
the quantitative signiﬁcance of falling minimum wages for wage inequality in the con-
text of a general equilibrium model.
In this paper I propose a general equilibrium model to analyse the effects of a per-
manent decrease in the value of the minimum wage on inequality. This model in-
corporates minimum wages, endogenous educational choices and endogenous tech-
nological progress. All these components are relevant in their own right: minimum
wages affect the educational decisions of individuals through their effect on job and
earning opportunities; educational decisions shape the skill composition of the labour
force and the ability composition of different skill groups; the supply of high- and
low-skilled labour affects the direction of technological change and the direction of
technological change affects the educational decision of individuals.
The analysis in general equilibrium reveals that a reduction in the minimum wage
affects overall inequality through three channels. First, a reduction in the minimum
wage widens the range of abilities present on the labour market, thereby increasing
the difference between any two percentiles in the distribution. Second, it differentially
affects the shares of high- and low-skilled workers at every percentile in the wage
49distribution, thus increasing overall inequality. A third channel is the reduction in the
skill premium per efﬁciency unit, which reduces inequality. Therefore, a reduction in
the minimum wage affects inequality at the top end of the wage distribution, even if
only to a smaller extent.
The full effects of minimum wage reductions are only realized in the long run.
Minimum wages affect the educational decisions of individuals in successive cohorts.
New cohorts have to replace old ones for the new equilibrium to be reached. Through
considering three simpliﬁed models, I show that the initial and highest increase in
all measures of inequality is due to the inﬂow from unemployment in the period of
the announcement. After this period, the observed skill premium contracts, while the
widening of the wage distribution continues due to compositional changes in both
ability and skills.
In this model, a reduction in the minimum wage reduces the skill-bias of technol-
ogy, since the inﬂow from unemployment is mainly into the low-skilled sector. In
future research I plan to test the robustness of the results to different labour market
structures. More speciﬁcally the low-skilled sector should feature either monopsony
or search frictions. In these scenarios the reduction of the minimum wage does not
affect unemployment to the same extent, but it still triggers an expansion of the high-
skilled labour force through the increase in the skill premium.
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55A R&D
A.1 Probability of successful innovation for a given R&D ﬁrm
The Poisson arrival rate of innovation for all ﬁrms indexed by k = 1;2;::: when spend-
ing zk units on R&D is zk. Since Poisson processes are additive, the economy wide




k=1 zk  z < 1. In this case the probability




 ztdt = 1   e
 z
I assume that once a ﬁrm has a successful innovation, that ﬁrm receives the patent and
innovation on that line is ﬁnished for that period. Then the probability that matters is
the probability that a given ﬁrm has the ﬁrst innovation. The probability that ﬁrm k





The probability that ﬁrm k has the ﬁrst successful innovation until the end of the pe-








Which is what I wanted to show.
A.2 Monopoly pricing
Lemma 2. If q > (1 )
 
1 
 then at any moment in time only the best quality of any machine
will be bought at its monopoly price.
Proof. When the marginal cost of producing a machine of quality q1 is q1, then given
the demand in (5) the monopoly price of this machine is 1 =
q1
1 . If an intermediate













56If the ﬁrm instead uses a lower q2 =
q1
qk quality machine at the price of its marginal cost













If 1 > 2 for all k > 0 integers, then only the best quality of any machine will be
bought in equilibrium at its monopoly price.
The 1 > 2 condition is equivalent to:
(1   )
1 








With some algebra we get that this is equivalent to:
q




Since the above holds for k = 1 and q > 1, it holds for all k  1.
B Steady State
B.1
Since the total size of the population is constant, both Nh and Nl are constant along
the BGP. The supply of effective labour, Nh and Nl can only be constant if the thresh-
old abilities for unemployment, al;ah and the optimal education decision e(a;c) for all




































57The relative price of the intermediate goods depends on the relative quality and the



















Since  6= 0 the relative quality, Q
t = Qh
t =Ql
t is constant in the steady state. This
also immediately implies that the relative price of the intermediates, p = ph
t =pl
t is
constant in the steady state. Since the price of the ﬁnal good is normalized to one, this
also implies that ph and pl are constant.
If prices of intermediate goods are constant, and the supply of both types of ef-
fective labour is constant, then from (6), the per period proﬁt from owning a leading
vintage of quality q is constant as well. In the next section I show that constant period
proﬁts imply that steady state R&D investments on a line j in sector s are independent
of the quality of the leading vintage in that line.
B.2 R&D spending
Using that the steady state proﬁts in sector s are constant:
Lemma 3. The total R&D spending on any line for a given quality is constant along the BGP:
z
j;s
t (q) = z
j;s
t+T(q) = zj;s(q) for all t;T  0.
Proof. The R&D spending on each line has to be either constant or growing at a con-
stant rate along the balanced growth path. This implies that the equilibrium total R&D




t (q). Where  > 0 is
the growth rate of the R&D spending on line j in sector s for a given quality q. In
what follows I denote z
j;s
t (q) by zt. Conditional on quality q, the per period proﬁt is
constant, sq, since both Ns and ps are constant along the BGP. Iterating forward (7),









(1 + r) :






























(1+r)k (1   e ztT):
To simplify notation denote ak 
k 1
 1 and zt  b. Since the above should hold for any
T > 0, this implies that the difference between two consecutive terms should be zero.



















This has to hold for all T > 0, even as T ! 1. There are three cases:  > 1,  < 1 and
 = 1. For  = 1 the above trivially holds for all T > 0.

























Where the second term is non-negative, implying a negative value as T grows very
large. Hence, for  > 1 (30) does not hold for all T > 0.
For  < 1 I will show that the second term in the brackets is strictly smaller than 1,
except in the limit. Denote x  bT, then as T ! 1, x ! 0. The ﬁrst term is smaller
than 1 for any x > 0:
xe x
1   e x < 1 , e
 x(1 + x) < 1
59For x = 0, e x(1 + x) = 1. The derivative of the left hand side is  e xx, which is
negative for all x > 0, implying that for any x > 0 the above inequality strictly holds.
The second term in the brackets is strictly positive for all T > 0 and ﬁnite. This implies
that the term in the brackets is strictly smaller than 1 for any ﬁnite T. Hence (30) does
not hold for any T > 0.
Therefore in the steady state zj;s is constant for a line with quality q. This also
implies that the value of owning the leading vintage with quality q in line j and sector
s is constant in the steady state. Its value can be expressed from iterating (7) forward












Note that the value of owning a leading vintage is proportional to its quality level.
This observation leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 1. In the steady state the total R&D spending on each line within a sector is con-




t+v = zs for all j;k 2 s and all v  0.
Proof. Using (8) and the steady state value of owning a leading vintage, the total










(1 + r   e zj;s(q))
1   e zj;s(q) :
The left hand side only depends on sector speciﬁc variables, hence the total amount
of R&D spending on improving line j in sector s is independent of the current highest
quality, q on that line. Since it is only the quality level that distinguishes the lines from
each other within a sector the corollary follows.
B.3
Therefore, the total amount of R&D spending on each line within a sector is equal and
constant over time. This equilibrium R&D spending is given by (20). In the steady
state zh = zl = z and the growth rate is g = 1 + (q   1)(1   e z).
60The price of the intermediates can be expressed from substituting the steady state

























Using the steady state relative price and the steady state R&D investment:
Bz
(1 + r   e z)














The right hand side is the steady state per period proﬁt from owning the leading
vintage normalized by the quality of the vintage. This proﬁt is increasing in both Nh
and Nl. If the labour supply increases, then any unit of investment into R&D has a
higher expected return, since there are more people who are able to use it. This implies
that the steady state R&D spending and the steady state growth rate is increasing in
the effective labour supplies.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 2













Nh is decreasing in ah. If

1    1 < 0 then the right hand side is decreasing in ah,




1    1 > 0, then both the right and the left hand side is increasing in ah. The























61The second two terms are smaller than one, and the ﬁrst term is also smaller than one
for any ah that gives a sensible unemployment rate. This implies that in the region of
interest there is a unique solution.
C Calibration
C.1 Ability and Cost Distribution
Given the assumptions on the distribution of a and c, and the thresholds al;ah and c






0(1   c)g(c)dc + 
R al













Where f() is the probability density function of the ability distribution and G() is
the cumulative distribution function of the cost distribution. The above expressions
account for the fact that those members of the new generation who choose to acquire
education only work 1   c fraction of the ﬁrst period of their life.
Note that the effective supply of labour is not equivalent to the measure of high-
and low-skilled individuals, the difference being that the former counts the total ability
available, while the latter counts the number of people. The measure of high-skilled,






























The cutoff time cost is found by matching the fraction of low-skilled:
L














and ah;al are the average abilities and wh;wl are the average wages in the two educa-
tion groups. The average ability in a sector is the ratio of the supply of efﬁciency units
of labour to the supply of raw labour in that sector: as = Ns=Ls. The supply of high-
and low-skilled raw labour, Lh and Ll are observed from the data, but Nh and Nl have
to be calculated using (34).
This way for any cost and ability distribution al;ah and c is given as a function of
thefractionofunemployedandlow-skilledworkers. Finallynotethatthethreethresh-
olds and the parameters of the ability and cost distribution are sufﬁcient to calculate
the average ability in both education groups.
C.2 Elasticity of Substitution
The consensus value is around 1.4 based on the paper by Katz and Murphy (1992).
This original estimate was based on 25 data points, and Goldin and Katz (2008) up-








These estimates typically adjust for productivity differentials within a skill-group, but
do not adjust for differentials between skill groups. Hence the labour aggregates H
and L are between the measure of effective labour and raw labour. The parameter
63estimate b 2 is interpreted as the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between the
two types of labour. I cannot use these estimates directly for several reasons.
First of all, the interpretation of b 2 is different depending on the assumptions. To

























in the transition. Thereby, the interpretation along the BGP is b 2 = =(1   )   1,
while along the transition it is b 2 =  (1   )=(1   (1   )). However, the estimate of
b 2 in the transition will be biased due to the lack of a good measure of average quality
in the two sectors. Second, as noted before, the measure of labour supply aggregates
used inKatz and Murphy (1992) are not the effective supply of labour, which in the
model determines wages. Moreover, the measure of skill premium is not the skill
premium per efﬁciency unit wh=wl of the model, it is probably closer to the average
skill premium. Due to these reasons, reinterpreting the implications of the value of b 2
for  is not sufﬁcient to use these estimates in my calibration.
D Transitional Dynamics
To use the Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe algorithm, all equations have to be deﬁned in
terms of variables that are stationary in the steady state. Let vs
t denote the normalized










Let t denote the normalized present value gain per unit of effective labour from ac-
quiring education conditional on being employed in every future period (normalized



















t s = l;h
vs









t+1 s = l;h
gs
t+1 = 1 + (q   1)(1   e zs




















































































































































I denote the initial steady state by a subscript 0 and the new steady state by a
65subscript 1.
E.1 Exogenous education, exogenous technology















Note that this adjustment only takes place if al
1 < ah
0 , that is if the decrease in e w is
large enough. When the change in the minimum wage is small, then the decline only
implies that some people should not get educated, because they would be productive
enough even without acquiring skills. However, since education is ﬁxed, this would


































 dj. I do not explicitly model the pricing
of the machines, I denote the price of a machine with quality qs in line j by s;j. The
assumption that technology is exogenous boils down to having Qh and Ql growing
at the same constant rate. If the pricing of machines would follow monopoly pricing
or competitive pricing, then this would be equivalent to a constant growth rate in the
quality of each line.
Since education and technology are ﬁxed, the new steady state is reached in the mo-
ment of the announcement. The lower bound of unemployment for the low-skilled,



















66which is higher than before.
E.2 Endogenous education, exogenous technology
The supply of high- and low-skilled workers in the new steady state are as in (34)
and (35), while through the transition they are governed by the same equations as in
section D of the Appendix. The threshold for low- and high-skilled unemployment
are given exactly as in (25) and (24) (again the transition is as in section D of the Ap-
pendix, except for Qt = Q here, since technology is exogenous). The cutoff time cost

































































It is straightforward that Lemma 1 applies in this setup as well. The only thing left to
show is that the two curves are both downward sloping, with the curve which gives
al for different values of c being ﬂatter. This curve is downward sloping as before: a
higher c implies an increase in the fraction of high skilled and a decrease in the fraction
of low-skilled, implying an increase in pl
t . This from (24) implies a lower al. The other
curve, which deﬁnes the optimal c for any value of al is also downward sloping. To
see this, consider an increase in al, which increases the relative supply of skills, as al
shifts up, the population between ah and al get a bigger weight in the relative supply
67of skills. An increase in the relative supply decreases the skill premium, which in turn
decreases c.
E.3 Exogenous education, endogenous technology
The supply of high and low skilled workers evolves the same way as in section E.1
of the Appendix. The main difference is that the intermediate price in the new steady
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